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Abstract: The IEEE 802 standards ease the deployment of networking infrastructures
and enable employers to access corporate networks while traveling. These standards
provide two modes of communication called infrastructure and ad-hoc modes. A se-
curity solution for the IEEE 802.11’s infrastructure mode took several years to reach
maturity and firmware are still been upgraded, yet a solution for the ad-hoc mode needs
to be specified. The present paper is a first attempt in this direction. It leverages the
latest developments in the area of password-based authentication and (group) Diffie-
Hellman key exchange to develop a provably-secure key-exchange protocol for IEEE
802.11’s ad-hoc mode. The protocol allows users to securely join and leave the wireless
group at time, accommodates either a single-shared password or pairwise-shared pass-
words among the group members, or at least with a central server; achieves security
against dictionary attacks in the ideal-hash model (i.e. random-oracles). This is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first such protocol to appear in the cryptographic literature.
Keywords: Password-based authentication, Group key exchange, Diffie-Hellman,
Provable security.
1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless technology enables us to use our laptops on the
couch at home or in hotel rooms, and gives us flexibility
in where and when we work in the business environments.
This technology makes it very easy to connect devices [34].
We only have to insert a wireless card into our laptop to es-
tablish radio link communications with fixed access points
through which we talk to other devices and access the In-
ternet. In this infrastructure mode, our laptop joins the
network by discovering a wireless access point and nego-
tiating with it the necessary temporal keys. The IEEE
802.11 working group defined the mechanisms for negotiat-
ing these keys via the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and
the 802.11i standards [34, 35]. A simpler communication
infrastructure for users that do not need broadband con-
nectivity is to transmit data by means of the devices them-
selves. This networking infrastructure allows rapid devel-
opments and minimizes costs since wireless access points
do not need to be deployed.
Wireless devices have the ability to operate an ad-hoc
mode as specified by the IEEE 802.11 standards; however,
the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol does not cur-
rently provide a security solution for it. The first solution
that comes to mind is to maintain a group key for each
sending device and to distribute the key to all the other
devices using pairwise keys established by WPA. This so-
lution, however, becomes impractical for groups of more
than ten devices as the number of keys grows exponen-
tially in the number of devices. Another solution is to de-
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velop a provably-secure group-Diffie-Hellman protocol for
the IEEE 802.11i standard. As wireless technology ma-
tures and bugs are fixed, the infrastructure and ad-hoc
modes will complement each other to bring the Internet
where broadband communication infrastructures do not
currently exist [25, 28].
Wireless networks provide security researchers with the
opportunity to develop provably-secure cryptographic tech-
nologies that will play an essential role in the deployment
of broadband communication infrastructures. The present
paper is a first attempt in this direction. It develops a
provably-secure password-based group-Diffie-Hellman key-
exchange protocol for IEEE 802.11’s ad-hoc mode, by ex-
tending the work of Bresson et al. in three ways [15].
Its first contribution is to accommodate a single-shared
password or pairwise-shared passwords among the group
members or at least with a central server; unlike Bres-
son et al. who only allow for a single-shared password.
Passwords are indeed frequently shared between users and
taken advantage of to exchange a group session key. For
example, a Bluetooth piconet is set-up once the devices
have exchanged a group session via a two-party Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol whose flows are encrypted
using pairwise-shared passwords [12]. A piconet is also
limited to eight devices.
Our second contribution in this paper is efficiency by al-
lowing users to securely join and leave the wireless group
at any time —the so-called dynamic case—. The dynamic
group Diffie-Hellman key exchange using public-key cryp-
tography was dealt with in [17], yet the password-based
group Diffie-Hellman key exchange was not dealt with in
the literature. We have revisited the scenario of Bresson et
al. to enable users devices to join and leave the group as
they move from one wireless domain to the next. Provid-
ing this “dynamic” feature in a secure way is not easy, but
of primary importance to wireless networks. Consequently,
the password-based protocol needs to dynamically update
the group session key so that entering and leaving users
do not gain access to previously exchanged messages. The
group session key can not also be static but needs to be
refreshed at regular intervals to prevent cryptanalysis [10].
Dynamicity in the membership and single-shared password
among the group members seem two counter-intuitive no-
tions at first. How can a user be forced to leave when every-
one in the group shares the same password? When a user
leaves the remaining group members exchange a new pass-
word by —as in the case of conference meeting— writing it
on the board or —as in the case of home networking— key-
ing the new password in each of the users’ devices. The lat-
ter scenario is made more practical using pairwise-shared
passwords among the group members.
Our third contribution is a more meaningful security re-
sult since security against dictionary attacks is achieved in
the ideal-hash model (i.e. random oracles); unlike Bresson
et al. who achieve it in both the ideal-cipher and ideal-
hash models [15]. We have leveraged these researchers’
formalization, wherein group members are modelled as or-
acles and the attacks of the adversary through queries to
these oracles, to reach this cryptographic result. The pro-
tocol is a one-mask Group Open Diffie-Hellman Key En-
crypted (GOKE) —in the sense of [13, 23, 24]— since not
all the flows of the original group Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change are encrypted but only the down-flow. The proto-
col indeed minimizes the use of the “encryption” function
(i.e. a mask-generation function), and is provably-secure
in the ideal-hash model and under the standard Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH). The ideal-hash
assumption is easier for engineers to implement than the
ideal-cipher model since engineers just have to replace it
with a straightforward construction from SHA-1 [5]. The
end result is a secure password-based authenticated group
Diffie-Hellman protocol well-suited to the IEEE 802.11i
standard.
Organization of the paper. Our paper is organized as
follows. In the remainder of this section we summarize
the related work. In Section 2, we recall the formalization
proposed by Bresson et al. to model security against dic-
tionary attacks in the group setting, and defer the reader
to their paper [15] for further details on this model. In
Section 3, we present the intractability assumptions upon
which the security of the protocol is based. In Section 4, we
describe the password-authenticated Diffie-Hellman Group
Open Key Exchange (GOKE) protocol, while Section 5 is
devoted to the security analysis. We finally conclude the
paper.
1.1 Related Work
The cryptographic literature on designing secure proto-
cols for password-authenticated key exchange is quite vo-
luminous. Protocols for two-party Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change [18] have been proposed and refined for over a
decade. The seminal work in this area is the Encrypted
Key Exchange (EKE) protocol proposed by Bellovin and
Merritt in the early 90’s [7, 8]. Security researchers, how-
ever, were only recently able to come up with formal argu-
ments to support the security of the complete suite of EKE
protocols [4, 1, 2, 11, 13, 14, 23, 24]. Instantiations for the
encryption primitive are either password-keyed symmetric
ciphers [2, 6, 14] or mask-generation functions computed
as the product of the message with the hash of a pass-
word [1, 11, 13, 23, 24]. Recently, Abdalla et al. pro-
posed an original mask-generation function computed as
the product of the message with a constant value raised to
the power of the password [4]; this new mask generation
function alleviates the need of a full-domain hash function
in the group. Security researchers also provided construc-
tions secured in the standard model based on general com-
putational assumptions, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption (using a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption
scheme), or even strong computational assumptions; how-
ever, these construction are not efficient enough for practi-
cal use [20, 22]. Engineers are now given a suite of secure
protocols to choose from depending on their security re-
quirements (ideal-cipher model vs. ideal-hash model) and
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the constraints of their software (one-flow or two-flows of
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange are encrypted).
In the light of these recent developments it was natu-
ral to provide engineers with a suite of secure password-
authenticated group Diffie-Hellman protocols. Password-
based protocols for the group setting have not been stud-
ied as extensively as the two-party case. Bresson et al. [15]
adapted the formal model of Bellare et al. [2] and defined in
it the execution of a password-authenticated group Diffie-
Hellman protocol. The protocol is the original group Diffie-
Hellman key exchange [33] with the flows randomized and
encrypted using a symmetric cipher keyed with a single
password shared among the group members [15]. The pro-
tocol, however, does not allow the parties to join and leave
the group at any time which is a feature of prime impor-
tance to the IEEE 802.11 standards since users join and
leave a group as they move from one wireless realm to an-
other. Bresson et al.’ protocol is secure against dictionary
attacks in both the ideal-cipher and random-oracle models.
The present paper extends the work of Bresson et al. [15]
to allow dynamicity in the membership, pairwise-shared
passwords, and stronger security results.
2 THE MODEL
Players. The players belongs to a nonempty set U of n
users who can participate in the group Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol P . A player Ui ∈ U may have many
instances called oracles involved in distinct executions of
P . The players also share a low-entropy secret pw taken
from a small dictionary Password of size N . This password
pw follows a certain distribution Dpw (uniform or not) in
the Password set. The probability Dpw (q) to be in the most
probable set of q passwords is denoted as follows:
Dpw (q) = max
P⊆Password
#P≤q
{
Pr
pw∈Dpw
[pw ∈ P ]
}
,
where Dpw (q) = q/#Password = q/N when the distribu-
tion is uniform.
Queries. The adversary A and its interactions with the
players are modeled by the following queries:
• Execute(U): The adversary gets access to honest exe-
cutions of the protocol. A gets back the protocol flows
of an honest execution of the protocol P between the
players.
• Send(Ui,m): A sends a message to the oracle Ui and
gets back the response oracle Ui generates in pro-
cessing the message m according to P . A initialize
the protocol using the Send(U1, Start)-query and gets
back the flow the first player should send out to the
second player.
• Reveal(Ui): This query is only available to A if oracle
Ui holds a session key. A gets back the session key
hold by an oracle.
• Test(Ui): The query can be only asked once by A,
and is answered by flipping a coin b and forwarding
the value of Reveal(Ui) if b = 1 or a random value if
b = 0. The query is only available to A if Ui is Fresh
(see below).
Dealing separately with the Execute and Send-queries
is especially significant in the password-based setting. In
effect the number of Execute-queries reflects the number
of off-line attempts the adversary can make to guess the
password, while the number of Send-queries reflects the
(on-line) attacks, thus the number of passwords, he may
have tried. Security against dictionary attacks is achieved
when the security bound does not depend on the number
of Execute-queries, but tightly on Dpw (qs), where qs is the
number of Send-queries.
Security Notions. The notion of AKE Security needs
to be achieved in the setting of game Gameake(A, P ):
• Gameake(A, P ) is initialized by providing coin tosses
to A, all Ui, and then:
1. Provide each player with a password pw dis-
tributed in Password,
2. Initialize any Ui with skUi ← null,
3. Initialize adversary A with 1` and oracle access
to all Ui,
4. Run adversary A and answer queries made by A,
5. At the end of the game, A outputs its guess b′
for the bit b involved in the Test-query.
• AKE Security: In an execution of P , we say that A
wins if it asks a single Test-query to a Fresh player U
and correctly guesses the bit b used inGameake(A, P ).
An oracle Ui is said to be Fresh (or holds a Fresh
key sk) if Πti has computed a session key sk 6= null
and neither Πti nor one of its partners has been asked
for a Reveal-query. The AKE advantage is denoted
AdvakeP (A) = 2Pr[b = b′] − 1, where the probability
space is over all the random coins of the adversary
and all the oracles.
3 THE COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH).
Let’s G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order q. A (t, ²)-
CDH-attacker for G is a probabilistic Turing machine ∆
running in time t that given the triplet (g, gx, gy), can find
gxy with probability greater than ². We denote this prob-
ability SucccdhG (∆):
SucccdhG (∆) = Pr
x,y
[∆(gx, gy) = gxy].
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L2 g
x2 gx1
L3 g
x2x3 gx1x3 gx1x2
L4 g
x2x3x4 gx1x3x4 gx1x2x4 gx1x2x3
Figure 1: The trigon structure T4.
Trigon Group Computational Diffie-Hellman As-
sumption (TG-CDH). Let n ∈ N be a parameter de-
noting the number of participants that can join the group,
In be {1, . . . , n}, P(In) be the set of all subsets of In, and
Tn be the trigon subset of P(In) as described below, which
does not contain In:
Tn =
j=n⋃
j=1
Lj with Lj =
k=j⋃
k=1
{ {i | 1 ≤ i 6= k ≤ j, i 6= k}}
=
{{}} ∪ {{2}, {1}} ∪ {{2, 3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2}}
∪{{2, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}} . . .
Let also GDHTn be the set:
GDHTn = {DTn(x1, . . . , xn) | x1, . . . , xn ∈R Zq} ,
where DTn(x1, . . . , xn) =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Tn
}
.
A (t, ²)-TG-CDHn-attacker for G is a probabilistic Turing
machine ∆ running in time t that given a group Diffie-
Hellman trigon D = DTn(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ GDHTn , can find
gx1···xn with probability greater than ². We denote this
probability SucctgcdhnG (∆):
Succ
tgcdhn
G (∆) = Prx1,...,xn
[∆(DTn(x1, . . . , xn)) = gx1...xn ].
Relation between TG-CDH and CDH. The TG-
CDH problem has been used previously in the literature
and shown to be equivalent to the CDH problem [15, 16].
The TG-CDH is random self-reducible which means that
an instance DTn(x1, . . . , xn) can easily be transformed in
an instance DTn(x1α1, . . . , xnαn), by exponentiating the
appropriate elements in the trigon (less than n2/2 expo-
nentiations). The solution of the first one is S = gx1...xn ,
while the solution of the second one is S′ = gx1α1...xnαn =
Sα1...αn .
4 THE PASSWORD-BASED GOKE
In this section we present the protocol for password-based
authenticated group open key exchange (GOKE).
4.1 Preliminaries
Let H0, H1 and H2 denote three hash functions, and f
denotes the encryption function. (This latter function
is in practice instantiated by a mask-generation function
computed as the product of the message with a constant
value raised to the power of the password [4].) We will
also use the transformation ψ which takes as input a k-
vector X = {X1, . . . , Xk} in Gk, an element x ∈ Zq,
and returns a k + 1-vector Y = {Y1, . . . , Yk+1}, where
for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, Yi = Xxi , Yk = Xk, and Yk+1 = Xxk .
For example, the n − th sequential call is computed as
Xi+1 = ψ(Xi, xi) (starting at X1 = {g}).
4.2 Algorithm
The protocol consists of an up-flow and a down-flow as
depicted on figure 2. In the up-flow, upon receiving i val-
ues Fi = {Fi1, . . . , Fii}, in addition to a knowledge proof
ValidityProofi, see below, player Ui (for i < n) chooses a
random exponent xi in [1, q−1], computes Fi+1 = ψ(Fi, xi)
as the values to be forwarded to the next player.
At the same time, in order to prove consistency in the
generated messages, which is required for the security anal-
ysis, the player also sends Wi = gxi together with a flow-
dependent, signature of knowledge for xi and the cor-
rect computation of the new values from the ones he re-
ceived. Player Ui computes the following knowledge proof
ValidityProof[xi : Wi = gxi ∧ Fi+1 = ψ(Fi, xi)](Fi). This
player then forwards all the received values.
Technical details. It is easy to compute the needed
ValidityProof (Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of
Knowledge), by a Schnorr’s like non-interactive version
of the proof of knowledge [31] using the Fiat-Shamir
paradigm [19], in the random oracle model [5], as follows.
Recall player Ui has received in the up-flow Fi a vector
(X1, . . . , Xi) and holds a fresh, randomly chosen Diffie-
Hellman exponent xi for the group key exchange. In or-
der to generate the proof of validity for Fi+1 = ψ(Fi) =
(Y1, . . . , Yi+1), the player chooses one random number r
in Z?q and computes Tk = Xrk , for k = 1, . . . , i − 1.
Then the random oracle is invoked to produce a value
c = H(T − 1, . . . , Tk,Fi,Fi+1) and the player uses r to
compute s = c− xir. The output ValidityProofi is made of
(T1, . . . , Tk, s,Fi). The verification is simply done by check-
ing that Tk = XskY
c
k for all k ∈ [1, i− 1] and Ti = Xsi Y ci+1
(note that c is easily retrieved by invoking the random
oracle again).
Formally speaking, we assume player U1 to receive F1 =
{g} and ValidityProof1 being the empty string. This means
that each player receives all the values computed by previ-
ous players, together with their proofs of validity. He thus
has to check all of them before computing his flow.
In the down-flow, upon receiving Fn of length n (as well
as the proof ValidityProofn), the last player Un chooses
a random exponent xn and computes (K1, . . . ,Kn,K) =
ψ(Fn, xn). We thus have K = gx1···xn as the last com-
ponent. And for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have Ki = K1/xi .
Then the player Un chooses randomly and independently
n−1 elements αi ∈ Z?q and sets K ′i = Kαii for i < n. These
values are used for the authentication. More precisely, let
pw i be the password common to Un and Ui (in case of a
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single-shared password, we have pw i = pw for all i); Un
sends to every other player Ui the challengeK?i = K
′
i·Upwi .
The player authenticates itself to the last player as fol-
lows. Upon receiving a challenge K?i , each player Ui
raises the “unmasked” challenge to the power of its pri-
vate exponent xi, and sends the resulting hash value
as its authenticator: Authi = H1(r1‖...‖rn, i,K ′′i ) where
K ′′i = (K
?
i /U
pwi)xi . The last player in turn authenti-
cates itself to the others as follows. He first waits for hav-
ing received all the authenticators Authi from the others.
The authenticator Authi is verified in a straightforward
way: Authi
?= H1(r1‖...‖rn, i,Kαi). One notices that K ′′i
should be equal to Kαi . If all the received authenticators
are valid the last player sends its own authenticator Auth′i
to every player Ui as well as the value Ki to be used to
compute the session key. The value Auth′i is computed as
H2(r1‖...‖rn, i,Kαi ,Ki). The last player then terminates,
accepting sk = H0(r1‖...‖rn,K) as its session key.
The protocol terminates successfully once each player
has checked the validity of the authenticators: Auth′i =
H2(r1‖...‖rn, i,K ′′i ,Ki). If the authenticator is valid the
player terminates, accepting sk = H0(r1‖...‖rn,Kxii ) as
its session key.
4.3 Rationale
Two ingredients are essential from the security view point:
proofs of validity and key confirmation steps before the last
player communicates the Ki’s. Otherwise, an adversary
could send non-valid flows and then introduce redundancy
which could help to perform a dictionary attack: assume
that A tries to impersonate U1, and thus sends incorrect
values {g, Ur} to U2. The latter playing honestly will send
{gx2 , Ur, Urx2}. Knowing r, the adversary learns Ux2 . On
top of that, A also tries to impersonate the group controller
and sends K∗2 = U
s, for a known s. The authenticator sent
back by U2 is derived from (Ux2)s−pw , a value easily tested
by the adversary, for all the passwords: a dictionary attack.
4.4 Practical considerations
The GOKE protocol can be used with different passwords
shared between each group member Ui and the last mem-
ber Un in the group. GOKE can also be made more ef-
ficient, and therefore more practical, by allowing Un to
verify all the proofs of knowledge once rather than by let-
ting each player Ui verifies the proof of knowledge one at
a time. This enables Un to batch the verification of the
knowledge proofs and to speed-up the verification phase
by a factor 2 [3, 26].
It is also straightforward to allow users to join and
leave the group in the course of the GOKE protocol [17].
When one or more players are added to the group, the
last player Un initiates a sequence of up-flows, starting
from him (rather than from the first player): he simply
re-computes ψ(Fn, x′n) with a new, fresh exponent x
′
n then
the protocol continues up to the last joining player, who
becomes the subsequent group controller. Note that the
F1 g g
x1
F2 g
x2 gx1 gx1x2
F3 g
x2x3 gx1x3 gx1x2 gx1x2x3
F4 g
x2x3x4 gx1x3x4 gx1x2x4 gx1x2x3 gx1x2x3x4
Figure 3: Up-Flows received by the first 4 players.
values ψ(Fn, xn) had been previously used in the authen-
tication, however they were sent in the clear (that is, were
not masked with the password), so no additional informa-
tion is leaked when performing the join operation. Simi-
larly, when players leave the group, the group controller
sends authenticator to the remaining players, by using
fresh, new exponents. Here again, since the authentica-
tion procedures are done pairwise and independently, the
leaving players cannot gain any useful information.
5 THE SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we prove that the GOKE protocol is se-
cure against dictionary attacks under the Group Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman assumption and in the random-oracle
model. (At first we do not, like Bresson et al., addresses
concurrent executions of the protocol.)
Theorem 1. Let A be an attacker against the scheme de-
scribed in Figure 2, in which the password is drawn from
a dictionary of size N according to distribution Dpw . Let
qH and qs be the number of Hash and Send-queries the
adversary is allowed to make, respectively. Then we have:
Advake(A) ≤ 12Dpw (qs) + 4(q2H + qH)AdvcdhG (t′ + τG)
+4qHAdv
tgcdh
G (t
′ + qsτG) +
2qs
2`
+
2q2s
2s
where t′ ≤ t+qsnτG+ 64qHq
2
s ln(4qs/²)
²3 for a value ² satisfying
Advake(A) ≤ 2², and τG is the time needed for computing
an exponentiation in G.
Proof. We consider in the following sequence of games the
event S defined as b = b′, where b is the underlying, random
bit used in the Test-query and b′ is the bit returned by
the adversary. The semantic security aims to make Pr[S]
negligibly close to 1/2.
Game G0: This is the real game, in which we make ev-
ery player performing the actions as specified in the proto-
col (exponentiations of received flows, hashing, etc.). Also
we simulate the random oracles in a classical way, main-
taining lists of already asked values, together with the cor-
responding answers. In this game, we have by definition:
Pr[S0] =
Advake(A) + 1
2
.
Game G1: In this game, the simulated authentica-
tors and the final session key are computed using private
random oracles H′1,H′2 and H′0 in place of H1,H2 and H0
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respectively. More precisely, we do not compute the values
of K ′′i (neither K) anymore and set:
Authi = H′1(r1‖...‖rn, i),
Auth′i = H′2(r1‖...‖rn, i)
and sk = H′0(r1‖...‖rn).
We stress that these values are perfectly random for the
adversary, since the random oracles are private to the sim-
ulator. Thus the probability for the adversary of success-
fully forging an authenticator is at most qs/2`, unless a
collision appeared on the SID defined as r1‖...‖rn (which
is bounded by q2s/2
s.) Excepted these bad cases, the se-
mantic security of the session key is now perfect (since it
is computed using a random oracle the adversary has not
access to):
Pr[S1] =
1
2
+
qs
2`
+
q2s
2s
.
Moreover, the two games are indistinguishable unless the
attacker asks one of the “bad” values (r1‖...‖rn, i,Kαi) to
the random oracle1, which event is denoted AskH. The
remaining of the proof is thus devoted to upper-bound the
probability of such event.
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ Pr[AskH1].
Game G2: We show how to simulate the instances of
the players without knowing the exponents. We assume we
are given a TG-CDH-instance D(a1, . . . , an). Since we have
access to the extractors associated to any proof of knowl-
edge (as explained in the appendix A), we can properly
deal with the cases the received values have been built by
the adversary. We make use of this functionality to embed
the instance D in the protocol flows: We simulate the pro-
tocol by answering each Send(Ui,Fi)-query by extracting
all exponents put in it by the adversary (for the players
he is controlling); we then “remove” these exponents, and
obtain a line of the trigon. Taking the next line, we then
“reintroduce” the adversary’s exponents. On top of that,
we randomize the process by using multiplicative random
self-reducibility (with known randomizing exponents) to
process multiple queries asked to the same player: this es-
sentially adds at most n exponentiations per Send-query
(the Execute-queries are simulated by simply randomizing
the instance D). The last call (if asked to player Un) pro-
vides us with values Ki, that we use to compute the chal-
lenges K∗i . Recall that we do not have to compute the
values K ′′i nor K, then the remaining of the protocol (au-
thentication flows) is easily simulated.
The following (basic) lemma shows that such a simula-
tion is always possible:
Lemma 2. For each Send(Ui,Fi)-query asked to a player
instance Ui such that the number of simulated players (i.e.
players not under A’s control) up to index i is equal to t,
the answer is derived from the line Lt in instance D.
1More precisely, if he asks either (r1‖...‖rn, i,Kαi ) to H1 or
(r1‖...‖rn, i,Kαi ,Ki) to H2 or (r1‖...‖rn,K) to H0.
The proof uses a simple induction on t. Also we intro-
duce the notation t = φ(i); this simply means that player
Ui is simulated using the line Lφ(i) of the instance D. In
other words, Ui implicitly makes use of the exponent aφ(i).
We easily see that the simulation is perfectly indistin-
guishable from the previous game, if conditioned to the
success probability of correctly extracting the adversary’s
exponents. Then we get (according to section A and let-
ting ² = Pr[AskH1]):
Pr[AskH2] ≥ Pr[AskH1]/2.
However, the times of the simulation is a bit more expen-
sive:
t2 ≤ t+ qsnτG + 64qHq
2
s ln(4qs/²)
²3
,
for any ² ≥ Pr[AskH1]/2. The former contribution is for the
random-self reduction, while the latter is for the extraction
(see appendix A.)
We now derive two games, in order to analyze the prob-
ability of passive or active attacks. We first analyze active
attacks.
Game G3: In this game, we show how to upper-bound
the probability of event AskH. To do so, we modify the way
the challenges K∗i are computed, in such a way that the
password is not used anymore and becomes information-
theoretically hidden to the adversary. Indeed, we note that
the challenges K∗i are independent, random elements in G,
so we just simulate them by choosing a random exponent
αi and sets K∗i = U
αi . Intuitively we study what A can
do/learn on the authentication flows between Un and Ui.
Several cases may then appear, each of them leads to
a specific bounds. These cases correspond to the attacks
the adversary can mount against the 2-party authentica-
tions (between the last player and another one). We stress
that these cases are disjoint because we focus on the first
occurrence of the “bad” hash-query; thus the global upper-
bound is just the sum. Much more important, the simula-
tion is identical in these three cases, so we do not need to
condition by the probability of having correctly “guessed”
the case. For evaluating AskH, we postpone the choice of
the password after the answer of the adversary.
Case AskH1: the value K∗i is sent by the simula-
tor, but Ui has not been simulated. In this case, A
is likely to know the underlying xi so we just notice the
following. If AskH1 happens, the query Kαi asked by A is
equal to (Uαi−pw )xi , but, as said above, the password can
be chosen at the very end of the protocol. The probability
of such an event is thus upper-bounded by Dpw (qs).
Case AskH2: the value K∗i is sent by the simulator,
and Ui has been simulated as well. As described be-
fore, the challenges K∗i are simulated by random elements
Uαi , and the password is chosen at the very end, being
thus independent from A’s view. Our goal in this last
case is to show that, even if A controls some player Uj
(knowing xj), it cannot learn useful information from the
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Ui ↔ Un authentication. More precisely, because A does
not know aφ(i), he cannot ask the query K ′′i without (im-
plicitly) breaking the CDH problem. The following lemma
formally proves this.
Lemma 3. If there is a query DH(K∗i /U
pw ,Wi) for a
player Ui not under A’s control, one can solve the CDH
problem.
Proof. It is easy to see that since K∗i /U
pw = Uαi−pw .
Thus if we retrieve (with probability at least 1/qH) a value
Z = DH(K∗i /U
pw ,Wi), then we can compute DH(U,Wi) =
Z1/(αi−pw). Here Wi = gaφ(i) .
Case AskH3: the values K∗i and Auth
′
i are sent by the
adversary. Of course one cannot prevent the adversary
to test a password by sending to the players’ instances
many challenges he built by himself —and for which he
probably knows the discrete logarithm. The following
lemma shows, however, that A cannot try more than one
password when sending a challenge, then his probability of
success reduces to 1/N (N being the number of passwords)
for each Send-query. More precisely, if he tries to distin-
guish the simulated authenticators from the true ones by
testing two different passwords pi and pi′, and asking the
corresponding queries Kαi to H1, the solution to a Diffie-
Hellman computational problem can be recovered.
Lemma 4. Let K∗ be a challenge sent by the adversary.
Let us assume that the H-list contains at least two queries
DH(K∗/Upi,Wi) and DH(K∗/Upi
′
,Wi), for pi 6= pi′, then
one can solve the CDH problem in time t+ τG.
Proof. Remind that Wi denotes the quantity gaφ(i) . We
first notice that all flows sent in the protocol are of the
form g
Q
j∈J xj ; this is due to the fact that each flow is sent
with a ValidityProof proof. The consequence is that the
discrete logarithms of U in any of these values remains un-
known (otherwise one could easily get logg U by removing
the exponents embedded by A). Now let us assume that
there exist two queries Z and Z ′ in the H-list, satisfying:
Z = DH(K∗/Upi,Wi) and Z ′ = DH(K∗/Upi
′
,Wi).
By division, we get Z/Z ′ = DH(U,Wi)pi
′−pi. Since pi 6= pi′
and the group order is a prime, we can set w = (pi′ −
pi)−1 mod q. It follows that DH(U,Wi) = (Z/Z ′)w. As
noticed above, this value cannot be computed from the
flows themselves. Thus, unless the adversary can solve this
Diffie-Hellman instance, he can test at most one password
when sending a challenge K∗.
If the adversary forges an authenticator Auth′i, one shows
that A cannot guess the password better than at random
since neither the players’ authenticators nor the challenges
provide information on it; indeed, all these values are sim-
ulated by pure random strings or elements. Therefore the
probability that A makes a H2-query that helps to distin-
guish the games is upper-bounded by Dpw (qs).
This leads to Pr[AskH33] ≤ 2×Dpw (qs)+q2H×SucccdhG (t+
τG).
Gathering the three cases, we obtain (for active attacks):
Pr[AskH3] ≤ 3×Dpw (qs) + (q2H + qH)× SucccdhG (t+ τG).
Game G4: It remains to deal with passive attacks.
In a passive eavesdropping, we note that all exponents
are successively embedded in the protocol flows using the
ψ function (that is, φ(i) = i), and that the session key
is derived from the TG-CDH secret (by the random self-
reduction known to the simulator.) Also we note that the
challenges K∗i as well as the values Ki can be properly
simulated, without any additional material (these values
are included in the last line of the trigon instance).
In such a game, the probability that A asks the value
(r1‖...‖rn,K) to the random oracle H0 is easily related to
the probability of solving the TG-CDH-problem for the
instance D:
Pr[AskH4] ≤ qH × SucctgcdhG (t3 + τG).
Putting all together, we obtain the claimed result. uunionsq
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A PROOFS OF VALIDITY AND EXTRACTORS
As shown in section 4, an adversary could make calls
with invalid inputs, we thus need to make sure this can-
not happen: we require proofs of validity. We then de-
note by NIZKProof(X,Y ) a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge and membership for x, such that Y =
ψ(X,x), where X is a k-vector. Such proofs can be ef-
ficiently done in the random-oracle model [5], with sim-
ple indistinguishable simulation under the decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption, and with the additional property of
simulation-soundness [30]. Furthermore, we can extract x
with overwhelming probability, using an improvement of
the forking lemma [29], as we now explain with more de-
tails.
A.1 Main ideas
Each proof NIZKProof(X,Y ) contains a Non-Interactive
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge that the sender
“knows” the exponent used to build the element. In the
Random Oracle Model (ROM), a truly random hash func-
tion is used to construct such proofs. In order to be able to
use the property of “proof of knowledge”, we need to build
extractors of knowledge. However such extractors must be
constructed sequentially, otherwise the complexity grows
exponentially with the number of players n. To achieve
such situation, we require the hash function to be called on
the input the previously produced proofs of knowledge. In
other words, and very informally speaking, when querying
the random oracle to build proof number n, the (n− 1)-th
proof itself must be part of the query: this ensures that,
in a complete list of ValidityProof, each call to the ran-
dom oracle is made after the previous proof of knowledge
has been computed. To propagate this property over all
the executions of the GOKE protocol, we restrict our sce-
nario to non-concurrent executions. As a consequence,
the construction of knowledge extractors can be properly
chained and our proof complexity does not explode.
A.2 Details
We now show that from a correct proof (submitted to the
random oracle when building further proofs of validity) we
can extract the underlying exponent, with non-negligible
probability. We then consider that the adversary has con-
structed a correct
NIZKProof(X,Y ) = ValidityProof[x : Y = ψ(X,x)](Z),
where Z is itself a proof of knowledge for a correct com-
putation of X. We emphasize that there may be several
rounds of communication between the computation of this
correct proof and the moment it is queried to the random
oracle.
Let us assume that the adversary A is able to produce
such a proof with probability ν = ²+ 1/2k, where k is the
output size of the random oracle, and thus measures the
probability of correctness by chance.
We denote by S the set of choices for the random coins
ω of A and the random oracle H (restricted to queries
which include Z). Moreover for each of them we denote
by Ind(ω,H) the index of the H-query which corresponds
to the crucial query : the one in the final proof. With
probability ², this index is between 1 and qH .
By replaying the adversary A with the same random
tape ω, and by simulating another random oracleH′ that is
the same as H up to the Ind(ω,H)-th query (excluded), we
can extract the value x whose knowledge is proved. What
remains to show is that this strategy succeeds with over-
whelming probability (over the possible choices of (ω,H))
and after a polynomially bounded number of replays.
For any i, we define the set of the random values which
leads to index i: Si = {(ω,H) ∈ S|Ind(ω,H) = i}. We
define the good indices i, in I = {i|Pr[Si|S] ≥ α/2qH}, for
an appropriate α we will define later. Finally, we define
the good beginnings:
Ωi = {(ω,H)|PrH′ [(ω,H
′) ∈ Si|H′ ≡i H] ≥ α2²/4qH},
where the relation H′ ≡i H means that we restrict the
choice of H′ to the random oracles providing the same
answers as H for the first i queries. For any i ∈ I, using
the Bayes’ law:
Pr[(ω,H) /∈ Ωi|(ω,H) ∈ Si]
= Pr[(ω,H) ∈ Si|(ω,H) /∈ Ωi]
×Pr[(ω,H) /∈ Ωi]/Pr[(ω,H) ∈ Si]
< α2²/4qH × 1/(α²/2qH) = α/2.
And thus, Pr[Ωi|Si] ≥ 1− α/2. Furthermore, since all the
subsets Si are disjoint,∑
i∈I
Pr[Si|S] = 1−
∑
i/∈I
Pr[Si|S] ≥ 1−qH×α/2qH = 1−α/2,
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and consequently
Pr
ω,H
[∃i ∈ I, (ω,H) ∈ Ωi ∩ Si|S]
= Pr[∪i∈I ,Ωi ∩ Si|S]
=
∑
i∈I
Pr[Ωi ∩ Si|S] =
∑
i∈I
Pr[Ωi|Si] · Pr[Si|S]
≥ (1− α/2) ·
∑
i∈I
Pr[Si|S] ≥ (1− α/2)2 ≥ 1− α.
Then, when A outputs a valid proof, with probability
greater than 1−α, i = Ind(ω,H) ∈ I and (ω,H) ∈ Ωi∩Si.
In this case, we know that we can have a second success
with probability greater than α2²/4qH . And thus, after
−4qH(lnα)/α2² replays, the probability of failure is less
than α: the probability of success is more than 1− α.
Globally, the probability of extraction is more than 1−
2α, within time bounded by 4qH(ln 1/α)/α2².
A.3 Chaining the Extractors
In fact, we built a black-box extractor in the sense that
extracting a witness for a given proof of knowledge is fea-
sible independently from the other proofs submitted by the
adversary. If we suppose that the advantage of the adver-
sary is greater than ², it means that it can complete an
attack with probability greater than ² (independently of
its success since an incomplete game cannot lead to any
advantage). Now let us denote by qs the number of Send-
queries (active attacks) the adversary is allowed to make.
By taking α = ²/4qs, all the extractions are successful with
probability greater than 1− ²/2, and thus there is at least
one failure with probability bounded by ²/2. Excluding
these executions just reduces by one half the advantage of
the adversary: we can assume that all the proofs built by
the adversary are given with the witness.
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U1 U2 U3 U4
x1 ∈R Z?q x2 ∈R Z?q x3 ∈R Z?q x4 ∈R Z?q
r1 ∈R {0, 1}s r2 ∈R {0, 1}s r3 ∈R {0, 1}s r4 ∈R {0, 1}s
F2 = {g, gx1 ,ValidityProof1}
r1,F2−−−−−−−−→
F3 = {gx1 , gx2 ,
gx1x2 ,ValidityProof2}
r1,r2,F3−−−−−−−−→
F4 = {gx1x2 , gx1x3 ,
gx2x3 , gx1x2x3 ,
ValidityProof3}
r1,r2,r3,F4−−−−−−−−→
Verify ValidityProofi, ∀i
K = gx1···xn
Ki = K
1/xi
K′i = K
αi
i for αi ∈R Z?q
K∗i = K
′
i · f(pw)
< −−−−−− −−−−−− < −−−K∗i −−−−−−< −−−−−−−
K′′1 = (K
?
1 /f(pw))
x1
Auth1 = H1(r1‖...‖rn, i,K′′1 )−−−−−− > −−−−−−Authi −−− > −−−−−−−−−−−−− >
Authi
?
= H1(r1‖...‖rn, i,Kαi )
Auth′i = H2(r1‖...‖rn, i,Kαi , Ki)
< −−−−−− −−−−−−< −−−Auth′i, Ki −−−−< −−−−−−−
Auth′1
?
= H2(r1‖...‖rn, 1, K′′1 , K1)
K = K
x1
1
Figure 2: An honest execution of the password-authenticated Diffie-Hellman Group Open Key Exchange (GOKE)
protocol with four players U = {U1, U2, U3, U4}. The session key is ski = H0(r1‖...‖rn,K).
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